Hazardous Materials, CBRN and Energy Hazards Program

This program is the written, auditable system for protecting members at incidents involving hazardous materials, deliberate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) releases, illicit drugs and clandestine laboratories, and the energy hazards that have arrived in every district in the last decade: lithium-ion batteries in vehicles, homes and buildings, stationary energy storage systems, solar photovoltaic arrays and hydrogen. When this program is working, the department has declared in writing what level of hazmat service it provides and trained and equipped every member to that level and no further; nobody enters an unknown atmosphere without monitoring it, and nobody treats battery off-gas as anything but immediately dangerous to life or health; members leave every hazmat and battery incident through a decontamination corridor and their exposure is on a record that will still exist in 30 years; a member who finds a powder at an overdose call puts on gloves, keeps their hands away from their face, treats the patient, and is neither panicked nor careless; a crew at an electric vehicle fire identifies the vehicle, shuts it down, cools the battery or lets it burn out under watch, and escorts it to a yard where the tow operator has been warned; and no member has ever been told to overhaul a damaged battery system. The department can show every one of those with records.

Module switch: Required at the awareness and operations level for every department, because every suppression company will meet a hazmat release, an overdose scene, a battery fire or a solar roof. The technician sub-module applies only where the department provides a hazmat technician team; otherwise the department records its mutual aid or provincial team arrangement and keeps the awareness, operations and mission-specific elements.

Profile Worksheet question answered: 01 Program Profile Worksheet Part C, module 13 (Hazardous Materials, CBRN and Energy Hazards), and Part B (medical first response level, which sets the opioid and infection control scope).

• Action level: an instrument reading at which a defined action is taken (leave, ventilate, upgrade PPE, no entry); set by the department from the occupational exposure limits and medical direction, not read from the meter’s factory alarm.
• APIE: the hazmat incident management process: analyze the problem, plan the response, implement the plan, evaluate the progress (NFPA 470, 2022).
• Awareness level: the competency of a person likely to witness or discover a hazmat release and expected to recognize it, isolate, deny entry and call for help (NFPA 470, 2022).
• CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents released deliberately; the term the Canadian first-responder PPE standard uses (CSA Z1610-11).
• Decontamination corridor: the marked path from the hot zone through the warm zone in which contamination is removed from people and equipment before they enter the cold zone.
• Energy storage system (ESS): a stationary installation of batteries or other devices that stores electrical energy, from a residential wall unit to a container at a utility site (NFPA 855, 2026).
• IDLH: an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life or health; battery off-gas is treated as IDLH (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-50).
• Operations level: the competency of a responder who takes defensive action at a release from a safe distance, with mission-specific competencies added by the department (NFPA 470, 2022).
• Psychological safety: the shared belief that it is safe to speak up, ask, admit error and challenge a decision (Edmondson, 1999)DOI.
• Stranded energy: the electrical energy left in a damaged battery that cannot be discharged by normal means and can cause reignition or shock long after the fire (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01).
• Technician level: the competency of a responder who takes offensive action to control a release, in chemical protective clothing where required (NFPA 470, 2022).
• Thermal runaway: the self-sustaining, heat-producing reaction inside a lithium-ion cell that spreads to neighbouring cells and produces flammable and toxic gas (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01).
• WHMIS: the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System, Canada’s hazard communication system for workplace chemicals, aligned since 2015 with the Globally Harmonized System (Hazardous Products Act [CA], 1985; Hazardous Products Regulations [CA], 2026).
• Work-as-done: how a task is actually performed under real conditions (Hollnagel, 2014).

R = responsible, A = accountable (one per row), C = consulted, I = informed.

Generic duties: 01 Roles and Responsibilities. Team structure: 06 Program Improvement Teams.

Requirement. The department declares in writing the hazmat and CBRN service level it provides, maps it to the competency levels of NFPA 470, trains and equips every member to the declared level, and does not send members beyond it (NFPA 470, 2022; MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-9).

The levels and what the baseline department needs.

Minimum method. A one-page service level statement signed by the fire chief; the competency map in the training matrix (section 6); written mutual aid and provincial team call-out arrangements with contact numbers on every apparatus; dispatch screening questions for battery, EV, ESS, solar, gas and unknown-substance calls.

Evidence. Service level statement; training records by level; agreements; dispatch question card. Stage: S1.

Requirement. Every hazmat incident is managed by the APIE process inside the incident management system, with hazard control zones, air monitoring, PPE selection by risk assessment, decontamination before anyone leaves the warm zone, and a termination and debrief (NFPA 470, 2022; NFPA 1550, 2024, ch. 10).

Minimum method.

• Isolate and identify from a distance. Upwind, uphill, upstream. Use placards, labels, shipping documents, SDS, the Emergency Response Guidebook, CANUTEC and the shipper’s emergency response assistance plan (Transport Canada, 2024). Deny entry. Initial isolation and protective action distances from the Guidebook until the product is identified.
• Zones. Hot (the release and the area where the hazard exists), warm (the decontamination corridor and the entry control point), cold (command, staging, rehab, medical). Entry control at the warm-zone boundary records every member in and out (see Form - Hazmat Entry Log and Air Monitoring Record).
• Air monitoring before and continuously. Section 5.4.
• PPE by hazard. Section 5.3. SCBA is the default in any unknown atmosphere (NFPA 1550, 2024, s. 9.11.7).
• Entry and backup. No entry team without a backup team of equal number in the same level of PPE, ready at the entry point. Buddy rule inside. Medical monitoring before entry and after exit (section 5.6).
• Decontamination. Section 5.5. Emergency decon is set up before the first entry, even when the plan is defensive, because a contaminated member or a contaminated civilian will not wait.
• CBRN and criminal scenes. Police lead the criminal investigation; the fire department leads life safety and hazard control; evidence is preserved as the mission-specific competency teaches; unified command from the start.
• Termination and debrief. Accountability closed; exposures recorded; equipment decontaminated or bagged; hot debrief; exposure reports filed before end of shift.

Evidence. Incident records; entry logs; monitoring records; exposure reports; debrief cards. Stage: S1.

Requirement. Chemical protective clothing is selected by a documented risk assessment, meets the hazmat and CBRN ensemble standard, is inspected and tested on schedule, and is matched to the member’s training (NFPA 1550, 2024, s. 9.6; NFPA 1990, 2022).

Minimum method. The NFPA 1990 (2022) classes replaced the vapour-protective, liquid-splash and CBRN standards with one scheme (NFPA 1990, 2022); the department keeps a selection matrix by class against the hazards in its risk profile, and for deliberate CBRN events uses the selection, use and care guidance in the Canadian first-responder standard (CSA Z1610-11). Structural firefighting PPE is not chemical protective clothing and is never used as such; it is accepted for defensive operations outside the hot zone and for the energy-hazard incidents in section 5.9 with SCBA. Ensembles are inventoried by lot and expiry, stored to the manufacturer’s instructions, inspected after every use and at least annually, and vapour-protective suits are pressure tested to the manufacturer’s schedule, at least annually and after use (NFPA 1891, 2022).

Evidence. Selection matrix; inventory with expiry; inspection and pressure test records. Stage: S1 (matrix for the declared level), S2 (full care and maintenance records).

Requirement. No member enters an atmosphere that may be hazardous without monitoring it first, and monitoring continues while they are in it. The department sets written action levels, trains members on the instruments they carry, and keeps the instruments bumped and calibrated (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-51).

Instruments. Every first-due suppression company carries a four-gas instrument (oxygen, lower explosive limit, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide); companies with the air monitoring mission-specific competency add a dedicated hydrogen cyanide sensor (the fire-gas “toxic twin” with carbon monoxide, which the standard four-gas instrument does not measure), a photoionization detector for volatile organic compounds, and radiation detection; the technician team adds the colorimetric, pH and specialty instruments its service level requires.

Action levels (department defaults; confirm against the occupational exposure limits your jurisdiction adopts (J22 Exposure Limits, Heat and Cold Stress) and the department’s medical direction). The research gives these commonly used fire-service values: oxygen outside 19.5 to 23.5 per cent; flammable gas at or above 10 per cent of the lower explosive limit (leave and ventilate), with 20 per cent as “no entry”; carbon monoxide at or above 25 to 35 ppm; hydrogen cyanide at or above 4.7 ppm; hydrogen sulphide at or above 10 ppm; any reading on a radiation instrument above background that the department’s radiological procedure defines (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-51). At any of these, SCBA stays on, the member leaves or does not enter, and command is told. Readings are used to decide when filtering respirators may be used for exterior or secondary tasks, to protect investigators and support staff, and to document exposures; they are never an “all clear” for interior overhaul, where SCBA is mandatory regardless (see Respiratory Protection Program).

Where to monitor. Before entry; continuously during entry; at the decontamination corridor; in the rehab area; during overhaul; at the perimeter of a battery or ESS incident for hours after knockdown; in any below-grade or enclosed space.

Care. Bump test before each use or daily on the apparatus; calibrate at the manufacturer’s interval and at most every 30 days, and after any exposure that could have damaged a sensor; track sensor life; record every bump, calibration and failed test (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-51).

Evidence. Instrument inventory; bump and calibration logs; monitoring records with each incident; training records per instrument. Stage: S1 (four-gas on every first-due company, action levels written), S2 (full instrument set and records).

Requirement. Every member and every piece of equipment that enters a hot zone passes through decontamination before it enters the cold zone, and every contaminated civilian is decontaminated before transport (NFPA 470, 2022).

Three kinds.

• Emergency decontamination: immediate gross removal of contaminant from a person whose life or health is threatened, with copious water, before anything else is set up; clothing removed as needed. Set up at every hazmat and energy incident before the first entry.
• Technical decontamination: the corridor (toolkit item 4) for entry teams in chemical protective clothing: tool drop, gross wash, suit wash and rinse, suit removal, SCBA removal, inner glove and clothing removal, personal wash, medical check. Staffed by members in PPE one level below the entry team or as the risk assessment sets.
• Mass decontamination: large numbers of civilians, using apparatus and hose lines in a corridor, with privacy, warmth and a process for clothing and valuables; planned in advance for target hazards.

Link. The hierarchy of contamination control, on-scene preliminary exposure reduction after fires, clean cab transport, post-call station decontamination and the shower-within-the-hour rule are in Decontamination and Contamination Control Program. A hazmat incident ends with that program’s post-call steps as well as the corridor.

Evidence. Corridor setup checklist completed at every entry incident; decon equipment inspection; mass decon pre-plans; photos or diagrams from drills. Stage: S1 (emergency and basic technical decon), S2 (mass decon pre-plans).

Requirement. Every exposure or suspected exposure to a hazardous material, a battery gas, a drug or a radiological source is recorded against the member, kept for the length of the career plus 30 years, and available to the member and the physician. Hazmat technicians are under a medical surveillance program with baseline, periodic, post-exposure and exit evaluations (NFPA 1580, 2025).

Minimum method. The exposure report in SWP - Exposure Reporting is filed before the end of the shift for every member who was in the warm or hot zone, with the substance, duration, route, PPE, monitoring readings, decontamination done and any symptoms; the HSO keeps the exposure register; records feed the presumptive illness documentation in Occupational Cancer Prevention, Exposure Tracking and Screening Program. Technician medical surveillance is set with the department physician under Medical, Fitness and Wellness Program: a baseline before team assignment, a periodic evaluation at the interval the physician sets (annually or every two years), an evaluation after any significant exposure or symptoms, and an exit evaluation on leaving the team. Medical records stay with the physician and are confidential; the exposure register and the medical record are linked by the member’s identifier, not merged.

Evidence. Exposure register; retention schedule in 05 Document Control and Records; physician’s confirmation that the surveillance program exists and who is on it. Stage: S1 (exposure records), S2 (technician surveillance).

TDG. Members at the awareness level recognize the TDG placards, labels and shipping documents; the Emergency Response Guidebook is on every apparatus in current edition; CANUTEC’s number is on every apparatus; the pre-plans identify the rail, highway, pipeline and marine corridors and the fixed facilities in the district, with the shipper’s emergency response assistance plan contacts where they exist (Transport Canada, 2024; Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 [CA], 1992; Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations [CA], 2026).

WHMIS. Hazardous products in stations, shops and on apparatus (fuels, foam concentrates, cleaning agents, batteries, compressed gases) are inventoried, matched to a current safety data sheet available on every shift, labelled including when decanted, stored and handled as the SDS directs, and every member has general WHMIS education and workplace-specific training reviewed annually with the JOHSC. Supplier labels and safety data sheets follow the federal rules (Hazardous Products Act [CA], 1985; Hazardous Products Regulations [CA], 2026); the workplace side, including the training review, is set by the applicable WHMIS regulation, and most require at least an annual review (J21 WHMIS, Hazardous Materials and Asbestos). This element is the department’s WHMIS and hazard communication program; the policy is Policy - Hazardous Materials and WHMIS.

Evidence. ERG edition on apparatus; corridor pre-plans; WHMIS inventory matched to SDS; training records. Stage: S1.

Requirement. Members at overdose scenes, drug seizures and clandestine laboratories are protected against inhalation, mucous membrane and ingestion exposure to opioids and other drugs, without delaying patient care or over-dressing for a hazard that is usually small (CCOHS, 2018; Health Canada, n.d.).

Tiers and PPE (CCOHS, 2018).

Procedure essentials. Gloves on before contact; hands away from the face; no eating, drinking or smoking; naloxone carried and given for signs of opioid toxicity, with repeat doses possible and EHS called (CCOHS, 2018); decontaminate skin with soap and water, never with alcohol hand sanitizer or bleach, which can increase absorption (CCOHS, 2018); bag contaminated clothing; exposure report filed. Mental health and behaviour-change symptoms after a call are reported and the member is not left alone.

Clandestine laboratories. Do not enter except for a rescue; do not operate switches, lights or equipment; test the air before any entry; assume booby traps; treat as a crime scene under police lead; withdraw and isolate (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-17).

Evidence. SOG; naloxone inventory with expiry and temperature log; training records; exposure reports. Stage: S1.

Requirement. Members recognize a lithium-ion battery incident, treat the gases as IDLH, control the fire without penetrating the battery, never overhaul a damaged battery system, and hand the hazard over to someone who knows it is still there (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01; IAFF et al., 2023; MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-19, 6-50 and 6-53).

What the evidence says.

• A lithium-ion cell in thermal runaway produces heat and a mix of flammable and toxic gases (hydrogen, carbon monoxide, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen chloride and volatile organics are reported); runaway spreads cell to cell and can reignite hours, days or weeks after the fire appears out, because of stranded energy (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01; MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-50).
• Battery gases accumulating in a garage, a room or a container can deflagrate; the volume of gas depends on the chemistry, and an entry or a ventilation decision made without that in mind has injured responders in research mock-ups and incidents (IAFF et al., 2023).
• At an EV fire, the vehicle fire and the battery fire are different problems: extinguish the cabin and the ordinary vehicle fire, then confine the battery and either cool it directly with a large, sustained water supply or let it burn out under watch; manufacturers’ emergency response guides have been found inadequate and a clear area of about 15 m (50 ft) is recommended at tow and storage yards, though often not achievable (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01; FSRI, n.d.-a).

Minimum method (the SOG content; full steps in SWP - EV and Lithium Battery Fire and SWP - Solar PV and Energy Storage Systems).

• Dispatch screening. Questions on the call-taker card: is a vehicle, scooter, e-bike, power tool battery, home battery or solar system involved; is it inside a building; is it charging.
• Identify, shut down, watch. Identify the energy system from badges, charging ports, placards, the ISO 17840 rescue sheet where the vehicle carries one, the site’s NFPA 855 emergency response plan or the building owner (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01). Shut down: vehicle in park, off, chocked, high-voltage disconnect where trained; building rapid shutdown or disconnect; ESS emergency stop; isolate charging. Watch: thermal imager on the battery continuously; air monitoring at the perimeter; a watch period of hours before handover, and a written warning of reignition risk to whoever takes it.
• Full PPE and SCBA for every member near the battery, including after knockdown; off-gas is IDLH (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-50).
• Defensive unless there is a life hazard at an ESS or a battery fire inside a structure; nobody enters a gas-filled room or container; the ventilation decision is made on the deflagration risk, not by habit (IAFF et al., 2023; MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-53).
• Water supply. Plan for a large, sustained flow to cool a battery pack directly, or a decision to let it burn out with exposures protected. No penetration of the pack, no purchase points through the battery during extrication, a charged line at every EV extrication.
• No overhaul of a damaged ESS or battery pack. Ever (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-53).
• Damaged batteries inside buildings are removed to the exterior by the method the SOG sets, isolated from combustibles, never carried in an elevator, and monitored (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-50).
• Tow-yard escort and reignition. An apparatus escorts the EV to the recovery location; the tow operator is told in writing of the stranded-energy and reignition risk; the yard is asked to park it with the recommended clear distance from other vehicles and structures, or the best achievable; the department records the handover (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01).
• Storage distances and site plans. For ESS sites, the emergency response plan the installation standard requires of the owner is collected into the pre-plan and CAD, with system chemistry, capacity, disconnects, suppression and ventilation, and the owner’s technical contact (NFPA 855, 2026). The installation standard sets capacity thresholds for its scope and for aggregate quantities per fire area; record the ones that apply to each site (NFPA 855, 2026).
• Disposal. A written arrangement with the municipality or a contractor for damaged battery removal and storage; damaged batteries are not brought to the station.

Evidence. SOGs; dispatch card; ESS pre-plans; handover records; training records. Stage: S1 (SOG, dispatch card, PPE rule, no-overhaul rule, escort and handover), S2 (ESS pre-plans, disposal arrangement).

Requirement. Members treat every photovoltaic array as energized in any light, including artificial light and moonlight, and never cut, walk on or remove modules (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-34).

Minimum method. Identify arrays on size-up and in pre-plans; use the rapid shutdown where installed and know that it isolates the conductors from the array to the inverter, not the array itself; the utility isolates the AC side; apply water to energized equipment only as a fog stream from at least 10 m and never a straight stream; respect roof loading and the loss of ventilation area; ladders and aerials observe the limits of approach for energized conductors (section 5.12); overhaul around arrays is done with the array treated as live. Battery storage paired with the array is an ESS under section 5.9.

Evidence. SOG; pre-plan and CAD flags for arrays; training records. Stage: S1.

Requirement. Members recognize hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles, hydrogen fuelling stations and hydrogen process sites, and apply the hydrogen-specific tactics (NFPA 2, 2023).

Minimum method. Hydrogen burns across a wide range of concentrations (about 4 to 75 per cent in air), ignites with very little energy, burns with a nearly invisible flame and rises; a thermal imager finds the flame. Isolate ignition sources, let a jet fire burn while cooling exposures and the tank from the maximum distance, do not extinguish a leak fire unless the supply can be shut off, and expect a vehicle’s thermal pressure-relief device to vent in a known direction (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-19). Pre-plan fuelling stations with the operator.

Evidence. SOG; pre-plans; training records. Stage: S2 (S1 where hydrogen infrastructure exists in the district).

Downed power lines, energized vehicles and fences, limits of approach for aerials and ladders near intact lines, natural gas and propane leaks with LEL action levels, and utility coordination are in SWP - Downed Power Lines and Utility Emergencies, owned jointly with Emergency Operations Safety Program. Workplace electrical safety for shops, generators, charging infrastructure and electric apparatus is in Facilities and Station Safety Program under CSA Z462:24.

Requirement. The hazards in sections 5.7 to 5.11 are known before the call. Fixed facilities, TDG corridors, pipelines, marine terminals, ESS sites, solar installations above a size the department sets, EV charging hubs, hydrogen sites and known drug-production locations are pre-planned, flagged in CAD and reviewed on a cycle (NFPA 1660, 2024).

Evidence. Pre-plan coverage; CAD flag counts; review dates. Stage: S2.

Every hazmat entry, every battery or ESS incident, every exposure and every near miss in this program is debriefed at the scene and triaged under Incident Investigation and Learning Program within one business day. Energy-hazard incidents are reviewed by the team at least quarterly because the guidance is changing faster than any other area in this package; the SOGs carry the date of the guidance they rest on and are checked against new guidance at least annually (the guidance notes cited here carried 2026 dates as of October 2026).

(a) Work-as-done. Before the team writes or changes a procedure here, the learning team describes: how a company really decides whether to meter before entering a basement with a “smell of gas”; what happens to the four-gas instrument between calls and who actually bumps it; how members really handle a powder on a kitchen counter at 0200 with a patient not breathing; what the crew does at an EV fire on a highway shoulder with a 1,000 L tank and no hydrant; how a damaged e-bike battery got from a bedroom to the lawn last time; who told the tow operator what, and whether anyone wrote it down; what the decon corridor looks like with six members and one line; how the exposure report really gets filed at the end of a 14-hour night (Hollnagel, 2014; Conklin, 2012).

(b) Capacity and margins. What makes this work go right: a crew that meters by habit, an officer who holds the company outside until the reading is in, a dispatcher who asks the battery question, a thermal imager with a charged battery, a water supply planned before the battery goes, a regional team that answers the phone, a physician who knows the technicians. What erodes it: a single four-gas unit per station that is out for calibration, guidance that changes every few months, volunteers who have never seen an ESS, overdose call volume that makes the powder routine, long waits for the utility, and the pull to “finish the job” on a smouldering pack. The program protects the margin by putting instruments and the dispatch card on every first-due company, by the no-overhaul rule written as absolute, by a quarterly guidance check, by a training night on energy hazards every year at every station, and by making the exposure report a two-minute form that an officer files from the apparatus.

(c) Just culture. A missed meter check, an entry before the backup team was ready, a cleanup of a powder that should have been left, a pack opened during extrication, an exposure report filed late: each is reviewed for the conditions that produced it and what the system must change (Dekker, 2016; Reason, 1997). The learning firewall applies to every debrief, learning team, after-action review and post-incident analysis in this program. Conduct concerns go to a separate process run by different people (Marx, 2001; The Human Factor, 2026a). Filing an exposure report is never held against a member; not filing one is treated as a system problem first.

(d) Psychological safety. Any member may stop a hazmat or energy task by naming the hazard and the action: “Hold the entry, the meter is reading 15 per cent LEL at the door.” The officer acknowledges, acts or says in one sentence why not, and the call is reviewed later. Officers ask the member with the meter what the readings are doing before asking how the task is going. Leaders show it is safe to report by publishing, de-identified, the last exposure report that changed a procedure, and by answering every concern through the route in section 11 within 15 days (Edmondson, 1999)DOI. Members who are anxious after a drug exposure or a battery incident are told that reporting the anxiety is part of the exposure report and that peer support is available without a referral.

(e) Learning link. This program feeds Tier 1 After-Action Review for every hazmat response above awareness and every battery, ESS or solar incident; Tier 2 Post-Incident Analysis for any exposure with symptoms, any entry without a backup team, any battery reignition after handover, any deflagration or any PPE breach; Tier 3 Independent Learning Review for a death, a critical injury or a multi-agency CBRN event (Incident Investigation and Learning Program; method in Manual 02 - The Three Tiers and Event Triage; The Human Factor, 2026a). The AAR questions: What did we know about the product or the energy system before we committed, and when did we know it? What did the meter and the thermal imager tell us, and did we act on them? Who has the hazard now, and do they know?

Respiratory protection fit testing and SCBA proficiency are under Respiratory Protection Program.

• SWP - Hazmat Entry and Decontamination
• SWP - EV and Lithium Battery Fire
• SWP - Solar PV and Energy Storage Systems
• SWP - Downed Power Lines and Utility Emergencies (joint with Emergency Operations Safety Program)
• Referenced: SWP - Exposure Reporting; SWP - On-Scene Preliminary Exposure Reduction; SWP - Post-Call Station Decontamination; SWP - SCBA Donning, Use and Air Management; SWP - Confined Space Entry and Rescue.

The department’s opioid and clandestine laboratory operating guidelines sit with the medical first response procedures and cite section 5.8.

• Form - Hazmat Entry Log and Air Monitoring Record
• Technician exposure record (toolkit item 3); decon corridor setup checklist (item 4); EV incident checklist (item 5); ESS pre-incident plan template (item 6); quarterly indicator worksheet (item 7); training sign-off (item 8).
• Exposure register and retention schedule in {{Records system}} per 05 Document Control and Records.
• Service level statement; mutual aid and provincial team agreements; pre-plans; instrument logs.

Loop test. A member reports on Monday that the four-gas instrument on the rescue has been reading low oxygen on bump for a week and nobody knows if it has been calibrated. By Wednesday the instrument is out of service with a replacement from the spare pool, the item is in the register with the company officer as owner, the HSO has pulled the calibration logs for every instrument in the district, and the member has been told. Within the month, the gap in the calibration schedule is closed, a change notice goes out, and the quarterly update reports it as closed with the logs as evidence.

Audited against Checklist - Hazardous Materials and Energy Hazards. The five questions an auditor asks first:

1. Show me the service level statement and the training records that prove every suppression member is current at the operations level and every technician is certified.
2. Pick any first-due apparatus. Show me today’s bump test for its four-gas instrument and its last calibration.
3. Show me the last three battery, EV or ESS incidents: the monitoring record, the thermal imager watch, the handover warning and who signed it.
4. Show me the exposure register: the last ten entries, how long they are kept, and how a member gets a copy.
5. Show me the last concern a member raised about a hazmat or energy procedure and what they were told.

Accreditation crosswalk. This program’s records answer the hazmat program criteria on deployment objectives, regulatory compliance (annual refresher, medical monitoring, examinations, exposure record retention) and the annual appraisal (CPSE, 2019, criteria 5H.1 to 5H.3), the chemical exposure reduction and improvement process (11A.4), the contamination control program (11A.9) and exposure record keeping (11A.10). Hazmat first-responder-only agencies must still answer criterion 5H. The 11th edition applies from 2027; map the numbers again when it issues.

• Members have entered unknown atmospheres (carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide during overhaul, hydrogen sulphide at chemical suicides, carbon dioxide in refrigeration and beverage systems) without monitoring; firefighter guidance notes exist because of those events (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-51). Section 5.4 is the control.
• Structural gear has been used as chemical protection, hoods have come off during overhaul, and decon has been skipped so that contaminated gear rode home in the cab and the exposure was never written down, undermining the member’s later claim (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-9). Sections 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6 are the controls.
• Opioid scenes have produced both over-dressing that delayed patient care and bare-handed handling of bulk powder (Health Canada, n.d.; CCOHS, 2018). Section 5.8 is the control.
• Electric vehicles have reignited on flatbeds and in storage yards after the fire department left, packs have been punctured during extrication, and responders have entered gas-filled garages and containers before anyone thought about deflagration (NTSB, 2020, SR-20/01; IAFF et al., 2023). Section 5.9 is the control.
• Crews have assumed a utility disconnect de-energized a solar array and have cut conduit on roofs (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-34). Section 5.10 is the control.
• Clandestine laboratories have exploded when switches were operated (MLITSD, n.d., GN 6-17). Section 5.8 is the control.
• New hazards outrun procedures when nobody owns management of change; the quarterly guidance check in section 5.14 and the team’s cycle are the control.

Stage 1 (Foundation) is: the service level statement signed; awareness training for all and operations training for every suppression member, with the annual practical evolution; a four-gas instrument on every first-due company with written action levels, a bump and calibration log and a trained user on every shift; the hazmat response SOG with zones, entry control, backup team and emergency decon; the opioid procedure with naloxone and soap-and-water decon; the energy-hazards SOGs (EV and lithium-ion, ESS, solar PV) with the dispatch card, the PPE and SCBA rule, the no-overhaul rule and the tow escort and handover; the exposure report filed for every warm or hot zone member and the register kept; the Emergency Response Guidebook and CANUTEC on every apparatus; the regional or provincial team agreement; WHMIS inventory, SDS access and training in every station; the concern route announced.

Stage 1 cost. Instruments: a four-gas unit per first-due company plus spares and a calibration station (capital, plus annual sensors and gas). Training: one night per station for operations refresher, one for energy hazards, one for opioids (instructor time; volunteer time credited). Naloxone kits per apparatus. Handover warning cards and chocks. The program manager’s time, about four hours a month.

Stage 2 (Operating) adds the mission-specific competencies, the full instrument set, the technician medical surveillance program, ESS pre-plans with the owners’ emergency response plans, TDG corridor pre-plans, mass decon plans, ensemble care records, hydrogen pre-plans and the indicators reported quarterly.

Stage 3 (Learning) adds trend analysis of exposures against health outcomes, field trials of battery suppression methods and instruments, published lessons, and external review.

This chapter relies on the following legal requirements, which differ by province and territory. Check your jurisdiction’s section on each topic page before adopting it.

Incident number; date; product or hazard; zones established (time); entry control point location; entry control officer (role). Per entry: team number; members (roles and IDs); PPE class; SCBA cylinder size and pressure at entry; time in; task; expected time out; time out; pressure at exit; pre-entry vitals (time, by whom); post-exit vitals; decon complete (time); exposure report filed (Y/N). Backup team: members, PPE, ready time. Full fields in Form - Hazmat Entry Log and Air Monitoring Record.

Instrument ID; bump test (date, time, result, by whom); last calibration date. Per reading: time; location (zone, floor, point); O2 %; LEL %; CO ppm; H2S ppm; HCN ppm; PID ppm; radiation (units); action level reached (Y/N); action taken; initials. Rehab area readings; overhaul readings; perimeter readings at battery incidents with the watch period start and end.

Member (role, ID); team assignment date; baseline medical evaluation (date; physician confirms complete, no content); periodic evaluation dates; exposure events (date, incident number, substance, route, duration, PPE, monitoring readings, decon, symptoms, post-exposure evaluation date); exit evaluation (date); record retention: career plus 30 years; copy provided to member (dates). Medical content stays with the physician; this record holds dates and events only.

Fire Safety Research Institute [FSRI]. (n.d.-a). Electric vehicle fire experiments [Urban Fire Forum presentation, 2025–2026]. UL Research Institutes. https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Project/Storefront/Catalog/Files/Member-Sections/Metro-Chiefs/Urban-Fire-Forum/2026/ULRI-FSRI-UFF-Metro-Chiefs-EV-Experiments-UFF.pdf

Health Canada. (n.d.). Fentanyl exposure: Protection, treatment, myths and facts (adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017). https://cumming.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/teams/290/Fentanyl%20Exposure%20Protection%20Treatment%20Myths%20and%20Facts.pdf

Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]. (n.d.-a). Access to employee exposure and medical records (29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020). U.S. Department of Labor. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1020

Ontario Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development [MLITSD]. (n.d.). Firefighter guidance notes (Section 21 Advisory Committee; individual notes revised to 2026). https://www.ontario.ca/document/firefighter-guidance-notes